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Abstract 
This article explores the relationship between supervisory approaches to governance, 
punishment, and poverty among people with drug convictions. Tying government assistance to 
supervision could improve employment and economic outcomes. However, if experienced as 
punishment, recipients may forgo financial assistance and be more likely to experience poverty. 
Using information on policies that restrict access to welfare for people with drug felony 
convictions in the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplementary 
Nutrition Assistance Programs (SNAP), this paper makes two contributions. First, it documents 
state variation in the balance between supervision and punishment in these bans. Second, using 
data from NLSY97, it estimates how individuals’ likelihood of being in poverty is related to state 
SNAP drug ban policies. States have shifted away from overtly punitive policies denying access 
to welfare toward policies that increase supervisory requirements, especially for SNAP. This 
shows that punitiveness extends beyond work activation programs like TANF. Additionally, 
poverty among people with drug convictions is almost half in no ban states compared to those in 
full ban states. While poverty is lower in states that include supervisory requirements than in 
those for which a drug conviction fully blocks access to welfare, this difference was not 
statistically significant.	
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Introduction 
Theorists contend that governance in the U.S. has shifted dramatically, with criminal 
justice and welfare systems increasingly working together to control the behavior of socially 
marginalized people through punishment and supervision (Wacquant, 2009; Gustafson, 
2011). Punitive drug laws and other policies that have increased incarceration rates have been 
criticized as seeking to isolate, contain, and exclude marginalized segments of the 
population, especially African American men (Lynch, 2012). Welfare provision has also 
changed. Support has been redirected towards working families and away from the deeply 
poor (Shaefer et al., 2019). Beckett and Western (2001) argue for a resulting new penal-
welfare regime, marked by increased incarceration rates and reduced welfare support for 
socially marginal groups.  
In this view, punishment forms part of a wider system whose aim is to shape the behavior 
of poor people. Behavior modification includes setting expectations or goals; supervising 
people to make sure they are meeting those goals; and punishing those who fail to do so. As 
stated by Wacquant (2010: 199), both social welfare and penal policies are now “informed by 
the same behaviorist philosophy relying on deterrence, surveillance, stigma and graduated 
sanctions in order to modify conduct.” Importantly, this shift to supervision is often justified 
as a means to improve economic and other social outcomes of poor people. Rather than 
simply withdrawing state support, Lawrence Mead (1997) observes that this ‘new 
paternalism’ will increase the likelihood that the poor will constructively engage in programs 
that will help them overcome the personal barriers that keep them in poverty.  
In the criminal justice system, this shift can be evidenced by the widespread use of 
community supervision, in which people are allowed to serve time in the community, as long 
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as they meet the behavioral conditions imposed. Indeed, the majority of people under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system are in the community completing a period of probation 
or parole (Phelps, 2017). Supervision is also a key part of welfare provision. The focus of 
welfare services has changed from providing benefits with the aim of alleviating financial need 
to reducing welfare use, promoting marriage, as well as preparing and actively pushing recipients 
into work (Schram et al., 2010). Welfare case managers used to primarily determine financial 
eligibility for programs; they must now also match recipients with appropriate services to 
increase their employability, create job search requirements, monitor recipient compliance with 
these requirements, and decrease financial assistance (i.e. sanction) recipients who fail to do so 
(Raffas, 2017). Moreover, in both criminal justice and welfare systems, people who are 
supervised also become eligible for services beyond those available to other poor people, 
including job training and substance abuse treatment. Miller and Stuart (2017) have asserted that 
it is through their supervision that socially marginal groups become simultaneously eligible for 
both coercion and care.  
Individuals may experience supervision as coercion, care, or a mix of both (Phelps, 2020). If 
experienced positively, one could argue that increased supervision may lead to improved 
outcomes, especially compared to punitive measures such as incarceration and the withdrawal of 
welfare support. However, both criminal justice and welfare scholars have shown that punitive 
supervision can produce negative emotional and financial consequences (Edin & Shaefer, 2015; 
McNeill, 2019; Sherman, 2013; Wright, Fletcher & Stewart, 2020).  
In this article, as an example of the new regime combining supervision and punishment, I use 
drug ban policies enacted by states in order to explore their effects on one financial outcome: 
poverty. These bans were enacted with the passage of Section 115 of the Personal Responsibility 
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and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193), commonly called welfare 
reform. In this legislation, the U.S. federal government prohibits people with drug felony 
convictions from receiving financial support from two programs – Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) and the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). 
Although household members without drug felony convictions are still eligible to receive 
financial support and services, this provision has been widely criticized for its potential to 
increase poverty by limiting financial assistance to a group of people whose employment 
prospects are restricted both by their criminal record, as well as their need for substance 
abuse treatment (Allard, 2002; Godsoe, 1998; Hirsch, 1999).  
Importantly, welfare reform also allows states to enact legislation to modify or opt out of 
the ban. Twenty years after the federal legislation was passed, there is considerable variation 
between states in their felony drug ban policies (Luallen et al., 2018; Martin & Shannon, 
2020). Variation occurs because some states have opted out of the ban altogether, while 
others have enacted policies to allow people convicted of drug felonies to access benefits 
under specific conditions, including the imposition of increased supervisory requirements. 
Inherent differences between SNAP and TANF are an additional source of variation. While 
SNAP is a program aimed to help recipients seen as ‘deserving’ of government assistance 
because their financial need is due to factors outside their control, TANF is viewed as a 
program that primarily serves ‘undeserving’ mothers who are dependent on welfare and 
unwilling to work (Shaefer et al, 2019).  
This paper makes two specific contributions. First, I document the nature of, and changes 
in, state-specific supervisory requirements in drug ban policies since the passage of welfare 
reform. Doing so addresses two shortcomings of existing attempts to describe variation in 
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state drug ban policies. Despite the profound differences between SNAP and TANF, earlier 
studies simply focused on TANF bans or combined these two programs into a single policy 
choice (Luallen et al., 2018; Owens & Smith, 2017). These studies also pooled states that opted 
out and modified TANF bans into a single category, although recent research has shown that the 
state-level factors associated with these policy decisions are distinctive (Martin & Shannon, 
2020). The present study addresses these issues. It does so by capturing state- and year-specific 
variation in drug ban policies separately for SNAP and TANF, classifying them into one of three 
mutually-exclusive categories: full bans, in which states adopted policies that ban people with 
drug felony convictions from receiving any financial assistance; partial bans, in which states 
only allow people to access assistance if they meet additional requirements; and no bans, in 
which states do not take drug convictions in account when determining eligibility. This three-
level classification complements a recent contribution by Martin & Shannon (2020) on TANF, 
but extends coverage to SNAP, which has grown to become one of the most important programs 
in the social safety net (Parolin & Luigjes, 2019). I show that, as with TANF,  this neglected 
middle category is of particular importance because partial bans are the policy choice that allows 
lawmakers to impose supervisory requirements. Importantly, I also show that there is substantial 
variation between state TANF and SNAP drug ban policies, which suggests that researchers need 
to extend the scope of their research beyond TANF to understand state approaches to welfare 
provision. 
Armed with this improved understanding of state drug ban policies, the second contribution 
of this paper is to provide the first known estimates of how variation in SNAP drug ban policies 
may be related to poverty. While proponents of the new paternalism assert that increased 
supervision will reduce poverty by encouraging recipients to engage in work and treatment, a 
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wealth of welfare research on work activation programs has shown that arduous supervision 
prompts people to simply forego needed government support (Raffass, 2017; Wright et al, 
2020). In the case of drug bans, it is possible that increased supervision will lead to poverty if 
it is strenuous enough to deter people from applying for or from remaining in the program. 
The focus on SNAP is important here because, unlike TANF, it imposes few behavioral 
requirements on recipients (Sugie, 2014). Relative to TANF, SNAP therefore ought to 
provide a clearer signal on the relationship of interest. Furthermore, SNAP caseloads overlap 
more with those individuals who are likely to be involved in the criminal justice system, 
namely men without children (Tuttle, 2019).  
Overall, study findings suggest that supervisory requirements can be experienced as 
punitive even when part of relatively generous programs. More broadly, supervisory 
requirements may not lead to increased engagement in potentially beneficial programs, as 
envisioned by supporters of new paternalism. Instead, by showing the link between 
supervision and poverty, the study adds to the burgeoning literature on the potential 
punitiveness of coercive state supervision in both welfare and criminal justice systems. 
 
Background  
Drug addiction, punitiveness and supervision in the criminal justice system 
Governmental responses to people with substance abuse problems are an interesting case 
example of how criminal justice and welfare systems blend supervisory with overtly punitive 
approaches. Substance abuse policies have oscillated between considering addiction as a 
medical condition to be treated and a moral failing to be punished (Wahler, 2015). In the 
criminal justice system, the substantial population incarcerated for drug-related offenses is 
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evidence of a punitive response (Pearl, 2018). Meanwhile, alternatives to incarceration for 
people with substance abuse disorders have proliferated, including diversion and community 
supervision paired with drug treatment (Belenko et al., 2013).  
Despite these developments, research finds that community drug treatment programs do not 
reach the majority of people in need of substance abuse treatment (Chandler et al., 2009), and 
there is little consensus about the types of treatment that are most effective (Hamilton et al., 
2015). There is also considerable debate about whether the benefits derived from the services 
provided outweigh the potentially negative consequences associated with the close scrutiny that 
these services include (Zhang et al., 2013). McKim’s (2017) study of a residential substance 
abuse rehabilitation program for women showed that while the program studied was one of the 
few means through which poor women could access services and treatment, the program was 
more focused on disciplining behavior than providing resources. Women needed to reflect 
program staff’s view of them as ‘diseased and disordered,’ as well as stay sober, in order to 
succeed. Overall, McKim (2017) concluded that, while an alternative to incarceration, this 
program was also experienced as a form of punishment.  
This confirms findings of other studies that community supervision can be another 
manifestation of punitiveness (McNeill, 2019; Phelps, 2017; Natapoff, 2015). In his study of 
community supervision in Romania, Durnescu (2011) identified ‘pains’ experienced by 
probationers, including financial costs and the deprivation of time. Community supervision also 
engendered ‘emotional pains’: deprivation of autonomy as they were consistently required to 
meet and provide various forms of evidence to the probation services; stigmatization by 
employers and neighbors resulting from their probation status; and the feeling of living under the 
threat of punishment. Along with punitiveness being experienced by the persistence of 
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supervision, McNeill’s (2019) study in Scotland also revealed that probationers suffer due to 
being constructed as untrustworthy and unworthy of autonomy. Indeed, the idea of having to 
present oneself in a way that reflects the views of authorities in order to avoid punishment 
has also been documented among juvenile offenders (Cox, 2011) and mothers serving 
community sentences in the U.S. (Haney, 2010).  
Drug addiction, punitiveness and supervision in the welfare system 
Gustafson (2009) has documented a ‘criminalization’ of state policies relating to poverty 
in which the historical focus of welfare policies that have included the stigmatization, 
surveillance and regulation of the poor have become combined with two new elements from 
the criminal justice system. First, there has been increased collaboration between these 
systems, including the use of shared information systems (see also Gillom, 2001). Second, 
welfare policies are increasingly focused on addressing recipients’ ‘latent criminality.’ This 
focus is evident in efforts to control fraud among welfare recipients, as well as to limit access 
to aid for people with drug felony convictions (Gustafson, 2009).  
Like most scholars studying the increased links between the criminal justice and welfare 
systems (Garland, 2001; Soss et al., 2011; Waquant, 2009), Gustafson’s (2009, 2011) focus 
is on the TANF program, whose recipients have long been seen as undeserving of aid since 
their poverty is caused by their own values and behaviors (Katz, 2013). Overall, TANF has 
become increasingly restrictive, as well as paternalistic for those left on the rolls (Handler 
and Hasenfeld, 2006). TANF recipients are told the proper ways to act, including 
engagement in the labor market, are closely supervised to make sure they are doing so 
(Perez-Munoz, 2017). Failure to meet these obligations results in financial penalties or 
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sanctions. The process of establishing work requirements, monitoring compliance, and imposing 
sanctions translates into frequent meetings with case managers.  
Although substance abuse issues are not widespread among TANF recipients and are less 
important than other employment barriers (Metsch and Pollack, 2005), the presumed link 
between substance abuse and receiving welfare has informed both explicitly punitive, as well as 
supervisory measures. Thirteen states now require some TANF applicants to undergo drug tests 
as part of establishing eligibility. If applicants test positive, their benefits could be terminated 
(CLASP, 2019). Some state TANF programs also include supervisory provisions blending 
coercion and care for people with substance abuse issues. Many states have adopted drug testing 
policies that require applicants who test positive to engage in treatment programs in order to 
receive assistance. To encourage participation, states can count the time spent in drug treatment 
as work-related activities. Rather than being exclusionary, these policies adopt a paternalistic 
stance and seek to increase supervision in order to shape the behavior of recipients to conform 
with societal expectations about proper behavior (Perez-Munoz, 2017). 
Recipients’ experiences of supervision in TANF and other work activation programs closely 
mirror those revealed in studies of the criminal justice system. Specifically, recipients view 
supervision as punishment, rather than as a means to support them (McNeill, 2020). Mirroring 
the emotional pains of criminal justice supervision, welfare recipients report feelings of being 
continuously monitored (Jordan, 2018) and stigmatized (Seccombe et al., 1998). Recipients also 
describe pressure to act in ways that reflected how officials viewed them (Koch, 2018). Research 
on work activation policies has also consistently shown that financial penalties for 
noncompliance are linked to material hardship (Raffass, 2017) and are applied more often to 
recipients with multiple barriers to employment, including histories of substance use (Bauld et 
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al., 2012). However, in contrast to nonvoluntary interactions with the criminal justice system, 
when welfare surveillance becomes too burdensome or stigmatizing, recipients simply 
withdraw from the system (Morash et al., 2017; Sherman, 2013). A study of recipients in the 
UK documented that in order to avoid interactions with the welfare system, recipients turned 
to other sources of income, such as borrowing money from friends, visiting food banks, and 
crime (Wright et al., 2020). 
Although research on work activation policies has yielded insights about the 
consequences of supervision, it is important to note the welfare system is comprised of more 
than TANF. Over time, welfare provision has shifted from providing financial assistance to 
poor families to offering in-kind support to the working poor (Eden and Shaefer, 2011). One 
of the most significant welfare programs is SNAP, which provides poor households with 
vouchers that can be used to purchase food. As compared to TANF, SNAP serves a much 
broader population of recipients, including families, people with disabilities, and the elderly 
(Lauffer, 2017). In 2018, there were 2.3 million TANF recipients (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2019) compared with 39.3 million recipients of SNAP (Cronquist, 
2019).   
In terms of behavioral requirements for SNAP recipients, ‘Able-Bodied Adults without 
Dependents’ must either search for work or work at least 20 hours per week, but other 
populations are exempt from these rules. If recipients do not meet work requirements, they 
are disqualified from receiving SNAP for at least a month and might become disqualified 
from the program. As another example of its relative generosity compared to TANF, over 
time, the federal government has encouraged states to enact rules that help potential 
applicants access SNAP (Bitler and Hoynes, 2016), while also restricting the ability of states 
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to enact provisions, such as requiring drug testing as a condition of receiving aid (CLASP, 2019).  
Overall, there is evidence that recipients in both the criminal justice and welfare systems 
experience increased supervisory requirements more as a means of coercion than as a way to 
access beneficial care. Given this literature, I expect that poverty among people with drug 
convictions will be higher in full ban states than in states with partial bans or no bans. The more 
interesting comparison to consider is between full and partial ban states. Proponents of new 
paternalism have asserted that increased supervision, especially the requirement to engage in 
drug treatment, could help recipients overcome barriers to employment and thus reduce poverty. 
However, the review above has highlighted the negative emotional and economic consequences 
of punitive supervisory programs. Consequently, I therefore expect that poverty will be lower in 
no ban states than in states with partial bans. One of the primary contributions of this paper is to 
extend the analysis beyond work activation programs like TANF to SNAP, which is a relatively 
generous program providing assistance to a population viewed as deserving of state support.  
 
Methods 
Empirical approach 
This paper has two research aims. First, it documents changes in SNAP and TANF drug ban 
policies over time, including their emphasis on supervision versus punishment. I include both 
SNAP and TANF in the analysis to assess whether states enact comparable drug ban policies 
across these programs.  
I also examine the association between SNAP drug ban policies (full, partial, and none) and 
poverty among people with drug convictions. At least two approaches could be used to 
addressing this aim, both of which exploit variation in state drug ban policies. First, one could 
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look within individuals across time, relating changes in their poverty status to changes in 
their exposure to drug ban policies. Variation in drug ban policies can be obtained either 
from policy changes in the state where they reside, or because the individual moves between 
states with different policies. This approach would require accessing data that includes 
economic outcomes on people with drug convictions, which is not publicly accessible at a 
sufficient scale to permit inferential statistics. The second option, the one I pursue in this 
paper, is to compare outcomes of individuals in states with different state SNAP drug ban 
policies. To do so, using data drawn from NLSY97, I create a pooled cross-sectional dataset 
containing respondents with drug convictions. Respondents are matched to the states in 
which they reside, covering the period from 2000 until 2016.  
Using these data, I estimate variants of the following baseline logistic regression model: 
 𝑦!"#∗ =  𝛽%𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃"# + 𝑋′!"# + 𝑍′"# +  𝜇# +  𝜖!"# (1) 
 
where 𝑦!"#∗  refers to log odds of poverty for individual i in state j at time t. SNAP captures 
each state’s drug ban policy (none, partial, full) in a given year; 𝑋′ is a vector of individual, 
time-varying characteristics, and 𝑍′ is a vector of state-level features. Year fixed effects, 𝜇#, 
are included in order to absorb bias from year-specific economy-wide features, such as 
recessions, that may influence the likelihood that people with drug convictions would 
experience poverty. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for the 
fact that respondents with drug convictions can be included in multiple years of data. 
Individuals only appear in the sample in waves after the occurrence of their drug conviction.  
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Given the scarcity of people with drug convictions in NLSY97, there were years in which 
some states had no observations. Therefore, it was infeasible to use state fixed effects to control 
for stable, unmeasured but potentially relevant state characteristics.1 It was also not possible to 
use individual fixed effects since there is not always multiple observations per person. These 
limitations of the data and approach means the current analysis permits description of the 
relationship of interest, but cannot be used to make confident causal claims. 
To ease interpretation, results are presented as predicted probabilities or average marginal 
effects.  
State-level data and variables 
I used several data sources to create a dataset of state drug ban policies from 1996 until 2016. 
Given that states had to enact legislation to opt out of the federal ban, I started by using the 
online legal databases Lexis Library and Westlaw to find legislation or regulations outlining the 
treatment of people with drug felonies. Second, I compared the information gathered from 
existing research in this area (Luallen et al., 2018; Mohan et al., 2017; Mauer and McCalmont, 
2015), as well as a yearly government report on SNAP provisions (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2019). Third, if these sources yielded missing or contradictory information, I 
contacted local welfare administration departments.  
For each state and year, I created three categories of state drug ban policies:  
1. Full ban: Prohibits people with drug felony convictions from accessing aid under any 
circumstances.  
	
1 Although my dataset includes respondents nested within states, I do not estimate a multilevel or hierarchical model 
since I am interested in controlling for the lack of independence between observations rather than seeking to 
explicitly model how much of the variation in poverty can be attributed to the individual- and state-level (Bryan & 
Jenkins, 2016).	
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2. Partial ban: Allows people with drug felony convictions to access aid, as long as they 
meet additional requirements. These include waiting a specific period of time after being 
convicted or released from incarceration, or not having over a specified number of 
convictions. Most of these bans also include supervisory requirements, including 
engagement in drug testing and treatment, as well as compliance with probation and 
parole requirements. 
3. No ban: Does not consider drug felony convictions when determining eligibility.  
In the descriptive analysis, I present data on state drug ban policy from 1997 until 2016 
as it took time for states to enact their own welfare legislation in reaction to the new federal 
law (Owens and Smith, 2012).  
In the analysis looking at the relationship between SNAP drug bans and poverty, I 
include other state-level variables that may be related to both a state’s decision to pass a drug 
ban policy, as well as the likelihood that an individual would experience poverty. Following 
Beckett and Western’s (2001), I include measures of: the percentage of the state’s labor force 
that is unemployed, and the percentage of the state’s population that is African American and 
Hispanic. In line with related work, I also include variables measuring the ideology of state 
residents and lawmakers (Martin and Shannon, 2020; Soss et al, 2011); and the number of 
people incarcerated/100,000 residents (Martin and Shannon, 2020; Owens and Smith, 2012). 
Although prior studies have included a measure of the state violent crime rate (Martin and 
Shannon, 2020; Owens and Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2011), given this study’s focus on 
people with drug felony convictions, I also include a control variable for the number of drug 
arrests/100,000 residents. Last, I control for other SNAP policies to ensure that I am 
measuring the relationship between drug ban policies and poverty instead of the overall 
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generosity of the SNAP program: broad-based categorical eligibility, the average recertification 
period, and whether the state exempts the value of vehicles from asset limits on eligibility. 
Further details about the measurement and data sources for these variables are included in 
Appendix table A1. 
 
Individual-level data and variables 
Individual-level data on people with drug convictions come from the NLSY97. NLSY97 is 
an ongoing study designed to follow the experiences of young people as they transition from 
school into the workforce (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). The initial survey was conducted in 
1997 and was followed up with yearly interviews until 2011; since then interviews have been 
conducted bi-annually. This yields 17 waves of data, covering 1997 to 2016. Data for this study 
are restricted to the years between 2000 and 2016 since there were too few respondents with drug 
convictions in early waves of data collection. Along with detailed demographic and 
socioeconomic questions, at each wave of data collection, respondents are asked about their 
interactions with the criminal justice system since the last interview, including whether or not 
they were convicted. If the respondent was convicted, s/he is also asked to indicate the type of 
conviction.  
NLSY97 is the only dataset with information on people with drug convictions covering all of 
the U.S. over multiple years.2 It thus allows me to examine variation in state SNAP drug ban 
policies, as well as controlling for individual-level characteristics that are likely to influence both 
	
2 Along with NLSY97, the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study and the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent to Adult Health also collect information on criminal justice involvement, including the number and types 
of criminal convictions. However, the sample for the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being study was only drawn 
from 12 states. I also did not use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health because, 
although the sample is nationally-representative, researchers only collected information on criminal justice 
involvement in one wave.  
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the state in which people reside and the likelihood that they will experience poverty. 
However, these data impose limitations. Most importantly, until wave 12, the survey 
included a question about whether or not respondents were convicted of a crime since the last 
interview, but did not distinguish between misdemeanor and felony convictions. To 
maximize the number of cases, as well as the number of years in the analysis, I include all 
people with drug convictions in the sample. These issues mean that I am most likely 
underestimating the association between drug felony bans and poverty. Second, while the 
dataset is nationally representative, sampling is not designed to ensure a specific number of 
respondents from each state. This translates into a small number of people with drug 
convictions per state, and some years where there are no observations in some states. Given 
this fact, it was not possible to conduct a more causal analysis exploiting policy changes, 
such as a difference-in-difference approach. Third, although research has suggested 
important gender and ethnic differences in the way that people with drug addictions are 
treated in both criminal justice and welfare systems (McKim, 2017), the size of these 
subgroups was too small to investigate. Last, NLSY97 is a cohort study, which means that 
respondents have only been followed until their mid-thirties. Findings can therefore only 
apply to younger populations who came of age after the passage of welfare reform in 1996. 
The cohort’s relative youth also means that there were only 69 respondents with drug 
convictions that have children. I could not investigate the relationship between TANF drug 
bans and poverty since very few of these respondents would qualify for TANF. 
Despite these limitations, NLSY97 remains the dataset most suited to address my 
research question. NLSY97 is the only dataset with respondents residing in states across the 
U.S. that collects information on criminal justice system involvement. This means that I can 
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provide descriptive information about the relationship between different levels of SNAP drug 
bans and poverty rather than looking at the effects of changing the policy in one state. The 
detailed information collected by NLSY97, as well as its geographic coverage is evidenced by 
the fact that the data are widely used by researchers studying outcomes among criminal justice-
involved people (Apel and Sweeten, 2010; Brame et al., 2014), as well as the effects of state 
policy on individual-level outcomes (Pacula et al., 2015).  
From this dataset, I gather information on poverty, as well as other individual-level control 
variables. To assess poverty, I use a variable created by NLSY97, which compares a family’s 
total annual cash receipts before taxes from all sources to poverty thresholds that are based on 
the number of household members and the number of members under age 18. If the household’s 
income was below the federal poverty threshold (less than 1), the respondent was coded as living 
in poverty. I use federal poverty thresholds in this study as they are easily calculated using the 
dataset and are also linked to determining eligibility for welfare programs. However, it is 
important to note that this measure likely underestimates poverty in the sample as it does not 
reflect regional differences in the costs of living, include expenditures related to work, childcare, 
housing and medical expenses, or reflect the amount of financial assistance received from the 
government and other sources (Hutto et al, 2011).   
I also include a series of control variables that are related to both the likelihood of being 
convicted of a drug felony and the likelihood of experiencing poverty. Thus, I measure whether 
respondents are female or male (gender), African American or non-African American (ethnicity), 
have at least a high school education (educational attainment), and live with at least one of their 
biological children (parental status). For all of these characteristics, I created dichotomous 
variables due to the small size of the sample. Last, to ensure that I was testing the association 
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between supervisory requirements and poverty, I excluded the 38 respondents residing in 
Louisiana and North Dakota whose partial drug ban policies did not include increased 
supervision. 
 
Results 
State supervision in drug felony bans 
Figures 1 and 2 show trends in state TANF and SNAP drug ban policies over time. States 
are categorized based on whether they have a full, partial or no drug ban in place. These 
figures show substantial changes in access to welfare over time, as well as important 
differences between SNAP and TANF policies. The first notable finding is that, between 
1997 and 2016, states with full drug bans have decreased from a majority to a minority of 
states. In 1997, just over half of states had a full ban on benefits in place for TANF and 
SNAP programs. However, by 2016, only 10 states still had a full ban in place for TANF and 
7 states had a full ban for SNAP. Second, for people with drug felony convictions, states 
have increased access to SNAP more than to TANF. Thus, more states still have full bans in 
place for TANF than for SNAP. Additionally, while 19 states have completely removed bans 
on SNAP for people convicted of drug felonies, only 14 states have done so for TANF.  
[Figure 1 about here.] 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
Table 1 shows the combination of SNAP and TANF drug ban policies enacted by each 
state in 2016. This table shows that, for around 70 percent of states, SNAP and TANF drug 
ban policies are consistent with one another. The most common combination of state policies 
is to have partial bans for both SNAP and TANF. Further demonstrating the stringent nature 
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of TANF provision, there is only one state (Indiana) where the drug felony ban for TANF is less 
stringent than the ban for SNAP. Meanwhile, 11 states have SNAP bans that are less stringent 
than in their TANF program.  
[Table 1 about here] 
While the replacement of full bans with partial bans has increased the ability of people with 
drug felony convictions to access assistance, most partial bans have made assistance contingent 
on increased supervision (information on each state’s policy is included in Table A2 in the 
Appendix); 88 percent of states with partial bans for SNAP require supervision, while 81 percent 
of states with partial bans for TANF do so. The most common requirements among states with 
supervisory bans are participation or completion of a drug treatment program and meeting the 
conditions of their probation or parole. Additionally, far more states require drug testing as a 
condition of receiving assistance in their TANF program than in their SNAP program. The 
number of supervisory requirements also varies among states: while Alabama, California and 
Connecticut allow aid as long as people with drug felony convictions meet the conditions of 
probation and parole, in Missouri, to access SNAP, people with drug felony convictions must 
also engage in drug treatment and undergo drug testing.  
Partial bans without supervisory requirements include other restrictions, including waiting 
periods and caps on numbers of convictions. For example, in Louisiana, for both TANF and 
SNAP, people with drug felony convictions are not allowed to obtain financial support until one 
year after they are convicted or released from incarceration.  
Overall, this analysis shows that states have shifted from blocking people with drug 
convictions from accessing benefits to subjecting them to supervisory requirements. However, 
compared to TANF, state SNAP policies are more generous to people with drug felony 
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convictions. Thus, states are more likely to opt out of drug bans in their SNAP program 
compared to TANF. Importantly, states are also more likely to enact partial bans that include 
supervisory requirements under their SNAP programs.  
 
Drug felony bans, increased supervision and poverty 
In this section, I explore how SNAP drug ban policies are related to the likelihood that 
people with drug convictions will experience poverty. Table 2 shows the characteristics of 
the 413 respondents with drug convictions included in the analysis, as well as the 
characteristics of the states in which they reside. Importantly, around one-third of people 
with drug convictions had income below the poverty level, which is high compared to the 
level of poverty in the overall NLSY97 sample (18 percent). It is also important to note the 
overrepresentation of men in the analytical sample; only 17 percent of the sample is female. 
Additionally, only 15 percent of the sample currently resides in a household with children, 
which means only a small portion of the study sample would meet the household eligibility 
requirements for TANF.  
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Figure 3 shows the predicted probability of poverty estimated from equation (1), 
generated from the sample of respondents with drug convictions residing in states with 
different SNAP drug ban policies. Full results are presented in Table 3.  
[Figure 3 about here.] 
The analysis reveals that predicted probabilities of poverty among people with drug 
convictions are almost double in states that have a full ban on SNAP benefits than in states 
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with no drug ban, even after controlling for individual and state characteristics. In states that 
impose a full ban, the probability of living in poverty was 46 percent among people with drug 
convictions. The predicted probability of poverty among people with drug convictions was 33 
percent, or 13 percentage points lower, in states whose ban included supervisory requirements. 
As seen in Table 3, living in a partial ban state, as opposed to a full ban state, was not associated 
with a statistically significant difference in expected poverty after controlling for state-level 
characteristics and policies. Predicted poverty among people with drug convictions in states that 
opted out of the drug  ban was even lower at 25 percent, which is significantly lower than 
predicted poverty levels in full ban states even after controlling for other individual-level and 
state characteristics. Thus, we see that for SNAP, any modification of the drug felony ban is 
associated with decreased levels of poverty. However, the largest poverty reduction comes from 
states that have opted out of the ban completely.  
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
Discussion 
This paper examines changes in drug ban policies in SNAP and TANF programs over time. 
Prior research has merged TANF and SNAP into a single policy or created a category including 
both modified and no bans. Recognizing the important differences between SNAP and TANF, I 
describe trends in these policies separately. Supporting research showing the importance of 
supervision in both welfare and criminal justice systems, as well as research on drug felony bans 
in the TANF program, I find that states have increasingly adopted SNAP and TANF policies that 
allow people with drug felony convictions to access aid, as long as they comply with increased 
supervisory requirements. The most common requirements include engaging in drug treatment 
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programs, consenting to drug testing, and complying with the conditions of probation and 
parole. For people in community supervision, some of these requirements might overlap with 
those imposed as a condition of their probation and parole. For these recipients, the welfare 
supervision requirements will still create additional burden as they must provide proof that 
they are doing so for their caseworkers in both criminal justice and welfare systems. The 
additional requirements indicate that lawmakers have embraced the idea of new paternalism. 
Thus, along with providing additional financial resources, these policies seek to change the 
underlying behavior of poor people.  
Despite the increased focus on supervision, important differences still exist between drug 
felony bans for TANF and SNAP. Lawmakers have enacted less stringent bans on SNAP 
than on TANF. These trends clearly reflect differences in the underlying history of these 
programs, with TANF serving a highly stigmatized population. At the same time, the U.S. 
welfare system has become more generous in programs like SNAP that provide in-kind 
assistance to recipients who are seen as deserving of aid (Shaefer et al., 2019). These 
differences are important, since most researchers interested in overlapping welfare and 
criminal justice systems have either solely focused on work activation programs like TANF 
or lumped all welfare programs together.  
I then consider the association between the severity of SNAP bans and poverty among 
people with drug convictions. I find that poverty is lower among people with drug 
convictions in states that opted out of the drug ban, compared to full ban states. This makes 
sense, since people with drug felony convictions in these states are allowed to access 
additional financial support irrespective of these convictions. What is more surprising is the 
strength of the association: the predicted probability of poverty among people with drug 
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convictions in no ban states was almost half of that in full ban states. Turning to contrasts 
between full and partial bans, results do not support the assertion greater paternalism will lead to 
greater reductions in poverty. Differences in poverty comparing partial and full ban states were 
not statistically significant. This could be due to the emotional pains of supervision documented 
in the criminal justice literature. While people involved in the criminal justice system must 
endure criminal justice supervision or face penalties like incarceration, people in the welfare 
system can always simply drop out if they are willing to face the economic pains of doing so. In 
fact, existing research indicates that SNAP participation rates are sensitive to changes in 
supervisory requirements; participation significantly decreased after some states enacted work 
requirements (Harris, 2019).  
Study findings make contributions to several literatures: the effects of drug bans; the 
increasing links between welfare and criminal justice systems; and the consequences of mass 
supervision. First, this is the first known study that uses quantitative methods to show that 
poverty is lower among people with drug convictions in states that do not have SNAP drug bans. 
Instead of looking at outcomes, most of the existing literature has focused on either documenting 
the characteristics of states with specific drug ban policies (Martin & Shannon, 2020; Owens & 
Smith, 2012) or on critiquing the underlying assumptions of drug ban policies, especially the 
assumed link between substance abuse and welfare receipt among women (Eadler, 2011; 
Gustafson, 2011; Godsoe, 1998). A notable exception is a qualitative study following formerly 
incarcerated women in Pennsylvania showing that full drug ban policies further restricted the 
already limited financial support available to these women, given their poor labor market 
prospects and lack of family financial support (Hirsch, 1999).  
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Second, this paper uncovers broader links between criminal justice and welfare systems. 
Theorists have largely assumed that these two systems divide along gendered lines, with the 
criminal justice system used to control men and the welfare system used to control women 
(Wacquant 2009). These assumptions, and the fact that most TANF recipients are single 
mothers with children, have led to a focus on TANF – and consequently on women (Soss et 
al., 2011). However, programs like SNAP “serve as important safety nets for needy families 
and demand relatively minimal requirements” (Sugie, 2012: 1423). Importantly, this paper 
shows that the stringency or leniency of a state’s welfare system is dependent on the program 
being considered. Scholars interested in punitiveness and mass supervision must look beyond 
TANF, which serves an increasingly small proportion of poor people. Along with extending 
the analysis to SNAP, I show that the negative economic consequences of drug ban policies 
are not concentrated among women; the sample in this analysis was primarily composed of 
men. Further, a close analysis of drug ban policies themselves show that they create explicit 
ties between criminal justice and welfare systems. For example, the requirements that people 
with drug felony convictions must comply with the conditions of probation and parole to 
receive financial assistance adds to Gustafson’s (2011) finding that welfare and criminal 
justice bureaucrats are increasingly working together to manage the same caseload. 
Finally, this article adds to both criminal justice and welfare literatures, showing the 
potential negative consequences of mounting state supervision in the lives of economically 
vulnerable groups by explicitly considering a policy at the intersection of these two systems 
(Fletcher and Wright, 2018; Shaefer et al., 2019). The finding from this study that one’s 
likelihood of being poor is lower in a no ban state than in one with a partial ban calls into 
question the utility of supervision. It is important to note that supervision was associated with 
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poverty even in SNAP, which is seen as a program that helps a population deserving of state 
support and that is relatively generous in terms of other behavioral requirements. Overall, 
policymakers must ensure that supervisory programs, in both criminal justice and welfare 
systems, are designed in a way that respects the needs and autonomy of recipients instead of 
simply seeking to coerce them into proper behavior. 
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TABLE 1: Distribution SNAP and TANF Drug Felony Ban Provisions among States and 
the District of Columbia, 2016 
 
  TANF Policy  
  None Partial Full N 
SN
A
P 
Po
lic
y 
N
on
e 
District of Columbia 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Rhode Island 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
 
Delaware  
South Dakota 
 
 
19 
Pa
rti
al
 
 Alabama 
Alaska 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Nevada 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Wisconsin 
Georgia 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Texas 
Virginia 
 
 
26 
Fu
ll  
 Indiana 
 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Mississippi 
South Carolina 
West Virginia 
 
6 
 N 13 26 12 51 
Source: Author’s compilation of state legislative data. 
 
State supervision, punitiveness and poverty 
 36 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Individual and State Characteristics 
Variable Percent or Mean 
Individual characteristics  
Poverty 33.13 
Female 17.42 
African American 25.76 
High School diploma or more 68.25 
Household with children 15.25 
State characteristics  
Percent unemployed 6.13 (0.13) 
Citizen ideology 50.31 (1.04) 
Government ideology 45.14 (1.32) 
% residents African American 13.82 (0.82) 
% residents Hispanic 13.92 (1.23) 
Incarceration/100,000 residents 476.44 (14.47) 
Drug arrests/100,000 residents 506.65 (13.96) 
SNAP policies  
Full drug ban 38.61 
Partial drug ban with supervision 43.93 
No drug ban 17.46 
Broad-based categorical eligibility 47.21 
Average recertification period 8.46 (0.26) 
Vehicle exemption policy 57.59 
N 413 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses for continuous data. Sample includes respondents with 
drug convictions between ages of 18 and 35. Estimates are weighted to adjust for complex 
sampling design. 
Source: Individual-level data from rounds 4-17 NLSY97, collected between 2000 and 2016. 
State-level data compiled from multiple sources.   
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Table 3. SNAP Drug Felony Bans and Poverty among People with Drug Convictions: Average 
Marginal Effects  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
SNAP drug ban policy    
No ban -0.1997** -0.1932** -0.2082* 
 (0.0634) (0.0620) (0.0842) 
Partial ban with supervision -0.1376* -0.1193* -0.1331 
 (0.0594) (0.0591) (0.0706) 
Individual controls    
Female  0.0461 0.0409 
  (0.0696) (0.0676) 
African American  0.1017* 0.1407** 
  (0.0486) (0.0494) 
High school education or more  -0.1398** -0.1410** 
  (0.0538) (0.0536) 
Household with children  -0.0505 -0.0596 
  (0.0639) (0.0620) 
State controls    
Percent unemployed   0.0029 
   (0.0220) 
Citizen ideology   -0.0031 
   (0.0032) 
Government ideology   0.0023 
   (0.0021) 
% state residents: African American   -0.0082* 
   (0.0038) 
% state residents: Hispanic   -0.0002 
   (0.0031) 
Incarceration/100,000 residents   0.0001 
   (0.0003) 
Drug arrests/100,000 residents   0.0002 
   (0.0002) 
SNAP: Broad based eligibility   0.0578 
   (0.0641) 
SNAP: Recertification period   -0.0003 
   (0.0096) 
SNAP: Vehicle exemption   0.0006 
   (0.0633) 
Note: *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001. SNAP policy reference group is Full ban. All models include 
year fixed effects. N=414. In parentheses: standard errors clustered at the individual level.  
Source: All data sources cover years 2000-2016. Individual-level data from rounds 4-17 NLSY97. State 
legislative data compiled by author. Other data sources for state-level data detailed in Appendix A1. 
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Figure 1: State SNAP Policies, 1997ï2016
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Table A1. Sources for State-level Data  
 
Variables Details and Data Source 
Percent unemployed Data from "States: Employment status of the civilian 
noninstitutional population, 1976 to 2017 annual averages" 
collected by Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics. Accessed through the University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research National Welfare 
Data. 
Number of state residents Data from "Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: 
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2017"  collected by U.S. Census 
Bureau, Population Estimates. American FactFinder. 
Accessed through the University of Kentucky Center for 
Poverty Research National Welfare Data. 
Percent African American Data from “Bridged-Race Population Estimates, 1990-2016” 
collected by U.S. Census Bureau in Collaboration with the 
National Center for Health Statistics. 
Percent Hispanic Data from “Bridged-Race Population Estimates, 1990-2016” 
collected by U.S. Census Bureau in Collaboration with the 
National Center for Health Statistics. 
Government ideology Data from “Updated Measures of Citizen and Government 
Ideology” by Berry et al (2018). Accessed through: 
https://rcfording.com/state-ideology-data/ 
Citizen ideology Data from “Updated Measures of Citizen and Government 
Ideology” by Berry et al (2018). Accessed through: 
https://rcfording.com/state-ideology-data/ 
Criminal justice variables  
People incarcerated Number of people in a state’s jurisdiction serving sentences of 
a year or more. Data from “National Prisoner Statistics, 1978-
2016” collected by the United States Department of Justice. 
Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
Accessed through the Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (Study: UCPSR 37003).  
Number of drug arrests Number of people arrested for the possession, use and/or sale 
of drugs. Data from “Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
Data: Arrests by Age, Sex and Race” collected by the United 
States Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Annual data accessed through the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research.  
SNAP variables  
Broad based eligibility State uses broad-based categorical eligibility to increase or 
eliminate the asset test and/or to increase the gross income 
limit for virtually all SNAP applicants. Data from: Economic 
State supervision, punitiveness and poverty 
 42 
Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). “SNAP Policy Database, SNAP Policy Data Sets.” 
Recertification period Average recertification period (in months) for SNAP units 
with earnings. Data from: Economic Research Service (ERS), 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). “SNAP Policy 
Database, SNAP Policy Data Sets.” 
Vehicle exemption State excludes all vehicles from asset restriction limits. Data 
from: Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). “SNAP Policy Database, SNAP Policy 
Data Sets.”  
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